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CHAPTER SIX

LIMITS ON THE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT:
THEORIES AND PRACTICE
TYLER T.

OCHOA

SUMMARY

1he question of how long a copyright should last has troubled scholars and policymakers
ever since the first copyright statute was enacted. 1he controversy continues because
there are two divergent views concerning the basic rationale underlying copyright law.
Under the natural rights view, the author of a literary or artistic work has a natural
right to p rofit from the fruits of his or her artistic labor. TIle logical extreme of the
natural rights view is that copyright should be perpetual and is limited in duration
only because of certain practical considerations. Under the utilitarian view, however,
copyright exists primarily to encourage the creation and distribution of new literary
and artistic works. With a n exclusive right, a publisher can charge a higher-lhan
eflicient price, earning excess profits that are used to compensate the author. Because
the higher price is ineflicient and contrary to the public interest in the long run,
copyrights should last o nly as long as is necessary to accomplish their incentive function.
Historically, copyright terms have consistently increased over time, as common
law countries that i nitially adopted the utilitarian view have moved closer to t e
natural rights view in the interests of i nternational harmonization. 1his increase IS
consistent with public choice theory, which posits that when the benefits of a law are
concentrated but t he costs of that law are diffuse, a small well-focused interest group
will usually succeed in obtaining passage of the law, even if it does not benefit society
as a whole.

�

How long should a copyright last? This question has troubled scholars
and policymakers ever since the first copyright statute was enacted i n
England in 17 10 a n d continues t o do s o today. The controversy con
tinues because of fundamental differences of opinion concerning the
basic philosophy and purposes of copyright law. As explained below,
there are two principal schools of thought concerning the rationale for
and purposes underlying copyright law: the utilitarian view and the
natural rights view. While these alternative justifications for copyright
often work in harmony and lead to similar public policy prescriptions,
in the area of copyright duration they are in conflict and lead to dia
metrically opposed policy recommendations.

10 Alysoll Pllrker, 1'11111 A. Illlms IIlId Olnsfiml Sfcil/cck (l�L'), Time: limits and Constraints, pp. 149-178
�j 2UIU KOllillklijkc llrill N. V. I'nl/fcd ill tile NCfilcrlmuls.
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1.

THEORIES OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Copyright as a Natural Right
Under the natural rights view, the author or creator of a new literary
or artistic work has a natural right to profit from the fruits of his or her
artistic labor. The natural rights view finds support in the writings of
John Locke, who famously posited that property results from the mix
ture of a person's labor with anything appropriated from the general
state of nature (Locke 1988, 287-89). The application of Locke's theory
to literary property was stated eloquently by William W. Ellsworth,
speaking for the House Judiciary Committee in 1830:
Upon the first principles of proprietorship in property, an author has
an exclusive and perpetual right, in preference to any other, to the fruits
of his labor.... If labor and effort in producing what before was not
possessed or known, will give title, then the literary man has title, per
fect and absolute, and should have his reward: he writes and he labors
as assiduously as docs the mechanic or husbandman. The scholar, who
.secludes himself, and wastes his life, and often his property, to enlighten
the world, has the best right to the profits of those labors. (Gales and
Seton 1831,7: cxx).

/

This view also finds support in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which states that "Everyone has the right to the protections of
the moral and material i nterests resulting from any scientific, literary
or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author" (Art. 27(2)).
The logical extreme of the natural rights view is that the duration of
copyright should be perpetual. Only a handful of countries, however,
have ever enacted a perpetual copyright law, and most of those eventu
ally thought better of it and restricted the term of copyright.l There are
a number of reasons why copyright is limited in time, even in coun
tries that generally accept the natural rights view. First, legal recogni
tion of property rights is based in part on the economic efficiency of
exclusive ownership: common ownership of tangible property leads to
the so-called "tragedy of the commons" i n which the asset is depleted
by overuse. Unlike tangible property, however, intangible works of
authorship are "nonrivalrous" in nature and can be possessed by many
i ndividuals Simultaneously without restricting the possession of oth-

1 Sec, c.g., Law of May 27, 1 927, Arts. 1 5( I) & 36 (Portugal). 'Ihis law was repealed
and replaced with a life-plus-50-years term in 1 985. Law No. 45/85 of Sept. 1 7, 1 985,
Art. 31 (Portugal) .
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ers and without diminishing the value of the asset (Yen 1999, 550-53;
Lemley 2005, 1050-52). As a result, for intangible property, greater
n e t economic efficiency may be achieved by moderating the natural
rights view.2 Second, after a period of time, it often becomes difficult
to i dentify, locate, and negotiate with all of the heirs and assignees who
have a share of the copyright, meaning that many otherwise produc
tive uses o fthe work will not be realized because of transactions costs
(Ricketson 1992, 766; Dietz 1978, 161).3 'nlird, there is the possibility
that an author's heirs will try to suppress works of which they do not
approve or will license the works only with unreasonably restrictive
conditions that will harm the public's use and enjoyment of the work
(Ricketson 1992, 767-68). For all of these reasons, there is a public
i nterest in allowing unrestricted public access to and use of an intan
gible work of authorship after a limited period.
TIle Utilitarian View of Copyright
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Under the utilitarian view, copyright is an exception to freedom of
expression that exists primarily for the benefit of the public, in order
to e ncourage the creation and distribution of new literary and artistic
works. Without copyright, copiers would always be able to undercut
the i nitial p ublisher's price because they have not had to bear the fixed
cost o f producing the work. Publishers would therefore be unwilling to
pay authors for the creation of new works, and only authors who had
other sources of i ncome could afford to write. By eliminating competi
tion fro m free-riding copiers, copyright enables publishers to charge
m ore than the efficient marginal price, giving them profits from which
to compensate the author (Lemley 2005, 1054-55; Landes and Posner
1989). In the words of Thomas Babington Macaulay, speaking in the
House of Commons in 1841:

I

I

I
\

The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose
of giving a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a
tax on one of the most innocent and salutary of human pleasures....
I admit, however, the necessity of giving a bounty to genius and learning.

\

2 O ther scholars reach the same conclusion using natural rights philosophy, criticiz
ing the view that natural rights inevitably lead to perpetual copyright as "superficial"
(Yen 1990, 554-557).
3 Empirical support for this concern can be found i n studies concerning so-called
"orphan works," that is, those works for which a copyright owner cannot be located
despite a diligent search. (Register of Copyrights 2006, 26-34; Vetulani 2008, 7-8).
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In order to give such a bounty, I willingly submit even to this severe and
burdensome tax. (Macaulay 1853, 394)

But because this higher price is by definition inefilcient, exclusivity
should be granted only to the extent necessary to encourage the initial
creation and distribution of the work, and the work should enter the
public domain as soon as possible. llms, in Macaulay's words:
The advantages arising from a system of copyright are obvious. It is
desirable that we should have a supply of good books; we cannot have
such a supply unless men of letters are liberally remunerated: and the
least objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of copy
right. . .. [But] Copyright is monopoly, and produces all the effects which
the general voice of mankind attributes to monopoly. . . . [T]he effect of
monopoly generally is to make articles scarce, to make them dear, and
to make them bad.... Thus, then, stands the case. It is good, that authors
should be remunerated; and the least objectionable way of remunerating
them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is an evil. for the sake of the good
we must submit to this evil; but the evil ought not to last one day longer
than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good. (Id., 390-92).

(

Of course, determining exactly what period of copyright is necessary
to encourage the creation and distribution of the desired number of
new works of authorship is a daunting task. At one extreme, Stephen
Breyer (now an Associate Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court) once
argued that the lead time necessary for a free-rider to duplicate a
published book was sufficiently long that copyright might not even
be necessary to encourage publishers to make an initial i nvestment
in producing the work (Breyer 1970, 299-302, 309- 13; see also Tyer
man 197 1; Breyer 1972). Although this argument breaks down for
works initially distributed i n digital form (which are easily copied), the
fact that publishers make i nvestment decisions using very short time
horizons nonetheless suggests that relatively short terms of copyright
would be sufficient to encourage publishers to invest in distributing a
copyrighted work (Breyer 1970, 325).
At the other extreme, William Landes and Richard Posner have
questioned the basic assumption that works of authorship i n the pub
lic domain can be freely copied without losing their value. 'TI1ey posit
that "congestion externalities" exist, such that overexposure to a work
will cause consumers to value it less, whereas wise management of a
work over time will help it retain its value (Landes and Posner 2003,
484-88). Accordingly, while they agree that a relatively short fixed
term (about 20 years) is a sufilcient incentive for most works, they
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would allow copyrights to be renewed indefinitely for successive peri
ods (Id., 5 17- 18). Other scholars, however, dispute both the existence
of congestion externalities and the belief that continued private man
agement of a work benefits the public (Karjala 2006; Lemley 2004).
But even if short terms of copyright are sufficient to encourage pub
lishers to distribute new works, they may not be sufficient to encour
age enough authors to create new works. While it is undoubtedly
true that some authors would create new works even if no copyright
protection were provided, few would dispute that copyright encour
ages more people to become authors than would otherwise be the
case. Ideally, we would like a term of copyright that is sufficient to
enable an author to devote himself or herself to writing (or painting
or composing) as a full-time profession (Guinan 1957, 74). This may
include some provision for copyright to endure after the death of the
author, as there is anecdotal evidence that authors are motivated by
the need to provide for their heirs (See e.g. Brylawski and Goldman
1976, J 1l6-17, J20 1). On the other hand, long terms of copyright may
encourage a successful author to retire, instead of devoting himself or
herself to further creative activity. In addition, economists agree that
future benefits must be significantly discounted to take account of the
time value of money, so that the prospect of earning additional royal
ties in the distant future may proVide little motivation for the creation
of new works in the present (Akerloff et al. 2002, 5-7, 23).
In the face of such disagreements in economic theory and lacking
sufficient empirical data concerning the behavior of authors and pub
lishers, we may be left with little more than gut feelings in deciding
what the appropriate term of copyright should be. Accordingly, the
behavior of legislators and interest groups takes on added importance
in explaining how copyright terms are established in practice.
Public Choice 711eory
Public choice theory is a branch of economics that applies game theory
and decision theory to government action. One of the tenets of pub
lic choice theory is that because individuals tend to act rationally i n
their own self-interest, they will act t o try t o influence the legislature
only if the perceived benefit to be gained is greater than the cost to
the individual. 111e result is that a small interest group that has a lot
of money at stake in a particular bill will expend more resources and
will generally be more effective in lobbying the legislature than will

"\
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the general public, for whom the cost of the bill on an individual basis
may be very small (Olson 1965; Bard and Kurlantzick 1999, 2 16-28;
Lessig 2004, 2 16- 18).
Public choice theory works very well in explaining how decisions
concerning the duration of copyright are made. Consider, for exam
ple, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA),
which added 20 years to the terms of all existing and future copyrights
in the United States.4 It was estimated that the aggregate amount of
royalties that would flow to copyright owners fro m extending copy
right terms by 20 years was approximately $317 million (Rappaport
1998, 16). This works out to about $2.58 per individual voter.s But the
benefits of that extension would accrue largely to a handful of power
ful media corporations and a small number of heirs of very famous
authors. TI1US, it is rational for a large media company to spend mil
lions of dollars lobbying for copyright term extension (because the
benefit it would receive is several times greater), but it is also rational
for the individual voter to remain ignorant of the issue. As a result,
Congress disproportionately heard about the costs and benefits of the
law from copyright owners, and the CTEA passed by a substantial
margin, notwithstanding the fact that most academic commentators
believed that it represented bad public policy (See e.g., Bard and Kur
lantzick 1999; Karjala 1998; Lessig 2004, 2 18, 292-93).
Public choice theory helps explain why the scope of copyright pro
tection and the duration of copyright terms have steadily i ncreased
during the past three centuries and are rarely, if ever, dimin ished. In
the rest of this chapter, we will examine how the duration of copyright
terms has increased over time and summarize the current state of the
law regarding duration. Before doing so, however, it may be helpful to
discuss some international differences in the general attitude toward
the foregoing theories of copyright protection.
An International Perspective
As a general matter, common-law countries have proceeded from the
view that copyright exists primarily to serve the public benefit, while
civil law countries have historically placed a greater emphasis on the
1

P.L. No. 105-298, Title I, 1 1 2 Stal. 2827.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, there were about 1 23 m illion registered
voters in 1 998 (the year the CTEA was enacted). ( Bureau of the Census 2000, 3). I f
calculated o n the basis of the estimated 1 98 million people o f vot ing age, the amount
per person works out to ahout $J.(iO per person.
5
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n atural rights of the author. This is apparent in the very language used
to describe the law: while in common-law countries the preferred term
is "copyright," in most civil law countries the more accurate transla
tion in English is "authors' rights."6 It is also apparent in the greater
emphasis that civil law countries place on the "moral rights" of the
author. In most countries, in addition to the economic rights enjoyed
by the author, which can be assigned in exchange for monetary reward,
the author also enjoys an i nalienable right to control certain aspects of
the public presentation of his or her work. Thus, for example, Article
6bis of the Berne Convention requires member nations to recognize
the right of an author "to claim authorship of the work and to object
to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other deroga
tory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to
his honor or reputation."?
By contrast, while natural rights theories played a role in the devel
opment of copyright in Anglo-American law, it is clear that the pri
m ary justification for copyright in these common-law countries was a
utilitarian rationale. For example, the Patent and Copyright Clause of
the U.S. Constitution p rovides that "Congress shall have Power . . . to
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."8 The parallel construction of the Clause
i ndicates that copyrights are granted to "authors" for their "writ
ings" in order to promote the progress of "science" (broadly meaning
"knowledge" in the language of the eighteenth century), while patents
are granted to "inventors" for their "discoveries" in order to promote
the progress of the "useful Arts" (Walterscheid 2002, 1 1- 12, 1 15-33).9
Thus, copyrights exist to promote knowledge by encouraging the cre
ation and publication of new works. lO Both patents and copyrights,
however, may be granted only "for limited Times," a restriction imposed
i n order to prevent the abuse of monopoly power that had existed in
England prior to the Statute of Monopolies (which limited the dura
tion of patents) and the Statute of Anne (which limited the duration of
copyrights) (Ochoa and Rose 2002). In so doing, the Clause not only
In French, droit d'alltellr; in German, Urlzeberrecilt; in Spanish, dereclzo de alltor.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1 886, revised at Paris, July 24, 1 97 1 , art. 6bis, S. Trcaty Doc. 99-27, 1 1 6 1 U.N.T.S. 30
[ hereinafter Berne Convention).
H U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, d. 8.
9 On the meaning of the word "Progress," see Pollack 20(ll, 794-809.
In
See Twcntieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 1 5 1 , 1 56 ( 1 975).
6
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indicates that copyright should last no longer than necessary, but it
also endorses the view that the progress of knowledge is best served by
the creation of a "public domain," a body of works whose copyrights
have expired and which can be freely copied by anyone (Walterschied
2002, 265-77; Ochoa 2003; Litman 1990). 11
Despite these differences between nations concerning the princi
pal rationale for copyright protection, it is the case that something
approaching an international consensus has emerged concerning the
basic term of copyright in literary and artistic works. 1he following
history of the development of copyright terms demonstrates how, over
time, the United States and other common-law countries have gradu
ally moved away from their primarily utilitarian perspective and closer
to the natural rights theories of continental European countries, in the
i nterests of international harmonization.
2.

HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT DURATION

Through the Eighteenth Century: From Privileges to Copyright
England
After the i nvention of moveable type i n the fifteenth Century, Euro
pean monarchs quickly realized that the printing press could be used
as an instrument to spread sedition and heresy. Their response was to
assert legal control over the new technology: no one could operate a
printing press without royal permission. Such permission often took
the form of letters patent, a document granting to a particular printer
an exclusive privilege to prin t a particular book or class of books for a
specified period of time. Publishers were also required to submit any
manuscripts that they wished to print to government censors for their
approval (Patterson 1968, 20-27, 78-90; Kaplan 1967, 2-3; Rose 1993,
9- 1 1, 23-24).
In 1557, Queen Mary granted a charter to the Stationers' Com
pany, a guild of London booksellers and printers, which provided that
no one could operate a printing press in England unless they were a
member of the Company or unless they received a printing patent
from the monarch. Because the Stationers effectively had a monopoly,
they could prevent competition among themselves by agreeing to a
II

Sec also Sony Corp. of A mcrica, Inc. v. Univcrsal City Studios, Inc., 484 U.S.
4 1 7, 429 ( 1 9B4) .
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system of registration. Once secured by registration, the right to print
a book continued forever and could be bequeathed or sold, but only
to other members of the guild (Patterson 1968, 28-32, 42-56, 63-64;
Kaplan 1967, 3-5).
Under a series of decrees and statutes, no book could be printed in
England unless it had first been registered with the Stationers (Pat
terson 1968, 46-47, 1 15-39). In 1695, the last licensing act expired,
thrOWing the book trade into disarray. The Stationers petitioned Parlia
ment for relief, seeking a statute under which authors would have the
exclusive right to print their works-an exclusive right that could, of
course, be transferred to a publisher. As introduced, the proposed leg
islation did not limit the duration of these copyrights (Patt.erson 1968,
138-42; Rose 1993, 42-43). When the Statute of Anne was enacted
in 1710, however, the term of copyright in new works was limited to
14 years, with the possibility of renewal for a second 14-year term if
the author was still living at the end of the first. For books that were
already in print, the act provided a single 2 1-year termY These terms
were based upon those in the 1623 Statute of Monopolies, which had
limited patents for new inventions to a single term of 14 years; that
period, in turn, was derived from the traditional seven-year period for
most apprenticeships (Ochoa and Rose 2002, 677-8 1).
At first, the London booksellers simply ignored the term limit pro
vision. But as the terms of copyright began to expire, Scottish book
sellers began publishing competing reprints. This touched off a great
debate i n England concerning the nature of literary property. Estab
lished publishers argued that an author had a natural right of property
in his works that passed to the booksellers when the manuscript was
purchased. Under this view, the Statute of Anne merely provided sup
plemental remedies to an underlying common-law right that was per
petual. Competing booksellers argued that there was no common-law
right after a work had been published, and alternatively that any such
right had been extinguished by the Statute of Anne (Ochoa and Rose
2002, 68 1-83; Patterson 1968, 158-68; Rose 1993, 52-55, 69-78).
The common-law right was upheld by the Court of King's Bench
in Millar v. Taylor in 1769 (Patterson 1968, 16�-72), 3J but the defen
dant's view prevailed in the Scottish Court of Sessions in Hinton v.
Donaldsoll in 1773 (Boswell 1975; Rose 1993, 83-85). Finally, in 1774,

12
13

8 Anne c. 1 9. § 1 ( 1 7 10 ) (Eng.).
M illar v. Taylor. 4 Burr. 2303. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 ( K.B. 1 769).

\
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in the landmark decision of Donaldson v. Beckett, the House of Lords,
acting as the Supreme Court of Great Britain, rejected the claim of
perpetual common-law copyright and established that copyright was
limited in term under the Statute of Anne (Ochoa and Rose 2002,
683-84; Patterson 1968, 172-79; Rose 1993, 92- 104).14
F rance
I n pre-Revolutionary Prance, all books had to be approved by official
censors, and the author or publisher had to obtain a royal privilege
before a book could he published. Such privileges were exclusive and
were usually granted for a period of six years, but they could be renewed
indefinitely (Dawson 1992, 3, 7- 10, 22-27; Davies 1994, 73-77).
I n 1777, a series of royal decrees changed the nature of these privi
leges (Dawson 1992, 7-8, 18-19). The decree on the duration of privi
leges provided a minimum duration for all privileges of the l onger
of ten years or the life of the author ( 1777 Decree, arts. 3, 4),1 5 The
decree also prohibited the renewal of privileges and required a book
to be augmented by at least a fourth to obtain a new privilege ( Id., art.
2). Once a privilege had expired, anyone could obtain a "permission
simple" to print or sell copies of the work (Id., art. 6). 'n1is decree,
therefore, expressly recognized a public domain in books whose privi
leges had expired (Dawson 1992, 3).
After the Prench Revolution, a dispute arose concerning the exclu
sive privilege which had been granted to the Comedie Fraw;:aise to the
public performance of all dramatic works (Ginsburg 1990, 1006). I n
179 1, the National Assembly voted t o abolish the privilege and declared
that the works of any author who had been deceased more than five
years were public property (Id., 1006-07; 179 1 Act, arts. 1_2). 16 I n the
same decree, the Assembly granted to authors the exclusive right to
authorize the public performance of their works during their lifetimes,
and extended that right to the author's heirs and assignees for five
years after the author's death ( 179 1 Act, arts. 3-5).

" Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 240S, 9S Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1 774). For a fuller
account of the dehate, see Cobbett ISI3, 1 7: 953- 1003.
15 A rret dtl cOllscii por/allt regiclllcllt stir ia dtlrec dcs p ril'ii£lges ell librarie, Aug. 30,
1 777.
II> Act oOan. 1 3- 1 9, 1 791 ( Fr.). An English translation is availahle i n Sterling 2003,
1 256-57.
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I n 1793, a new law was passed giving all authors, composers, and art
ists the exclusive right to sell and distribute their works, and extending
the right to their heirs and assigns for a period of ten years after the
author's death.17 Although this law was based in part on the natural
right theory, ninteenth-century commentators characterized the 1793
law as utilitarian and "a charitable grant from sOciety" rather than a
full recognition of the perpetual right of an author's heirs to the fruits
of his labor (Ginsburg 1990, 1009-12).
The United States
I n 1783, i n response to several authors' petitions, a committee of the
Continental Congress reported that it was "persuaded that nothing
is more properly a man's own than the fruit of his study, and that
the protection and security of literary property would greatly tend to
encourage genius [and] to promote useful discoveries" (Continental
Congress 1783, 24: 326). Under the Articles of Confederation, the
Continental Congress had no authority to issue copyrights; instead, it
passed a resolution encouraging the States
to secure to the authors or publishers of any new books not hitherto
printed ... the copyright of such books for a certain time not less than
fourteen years from the first publication; and to secure to the said
authors, if they shall survive the term first mentioned , ... the copyright
of such books for another term of time not less than fourteen years (Id.,
326-27).

Three states had already enacted copyright statutes earlier that year,
and within three years all of the remaining states except Delaware had
followed suit. Seven of the states followed the Statute of Anne and the
Continental Congress' resolution in providing two 14-year terms. The
five remaining States granted copyrights for Single terms of 14, 20, or
2 1 years' duration, with no right of renewal (Ochoa and Rose 2002,
687-88).
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787, both James Madison of
Virginia and Charles Pinckney of South Carolina submitted propos
als to give Congress the power to grant copyrights for a limited time.
These proposals resulted in the Patent and Copyright Clause of the
U.S. Constitution (Ochoa and Rose 2002, 688-90). As noted above,

17 Act of July 1 9-24, 1 793, Arts. 1 , 2 (Fr.) . An English translation is available i n
Sterling 2003, 1 260.
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the Clause takes a utilitarian view of patents and copyrights, provid
ing that exclusive rights may be granted "to Promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts" but only "for limited Times."lB
The Copyright Act of 1790 granted copyrights for a term of "four
teen years from the time of recording the title thereof," with a right of
renewal "for the further term of fourteen years" if the author survived
to the end of the first term.19 The Act covered "any map, chart, book or
books already printed within these United States," as well as "any map,
chart, book or books already made and composed, but not printed
or published, or that shall hereafter be made and composed." Except
for the addition of maps and charts, this language was copied almost
verbatim from the Statute of Anne.
Because United States law was based primarily on a utilitarian the
ory of copyright, it made little sense to offer copyright protection for
any length of time unless the author or publisher affirmatively claimed
that he or she wanted the benefit of copyright protection. Thus, United
States law required that the author or publisher comply with vari
ous statutory formalities as a condition of copyright protection. For
example, the 1790 Act required that the author or publisher register
the copyright with the clerk of the district court before publication
and publish a notice of the registration in a newspaper for four weeks
within two months of the registration (Id. §3, 1 Stat. 125). An 1802
amendment required that the notice be printed in each published edi
tion of the work.20
In 1834, i n an American replay of Donaldson v. Beckett, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled in Wheaton v. Peters that, although the author of
an unpublished work had a common-law right to control the first pub
lication of that work, the author did not have a common-law right to
control reproduction following the first publication of the work, and
that strict compliance with statutory formalities was required i n order
to recover under the federal statute.21 Thus, in the United States there
developed a dual system of copyright protection. Before a work was
published or registered, it was protected under state law by common
law copyright, which provided a right of first publication of potentially

IH

U.S. Canst., Art. I, §8, d. 8.
Copyright Act of May 3 1 , 1 790,c. 1 5, § 1, 1 Stat. 1 24.
20 Act of Apr. 29, 1 802, c. 36, §l, 2 Stat. 1 7 1 .
21 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 ( 1 834). For a comprehensive discussion,
see Joyce 2005.
IY
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unlimited duration. After a work was published, however, one of two
things happened. If all of the statutory formalities were satisfied, the
work received a federal statutory copyright of the specified duration;
but if the formalities were not observed, the work immediately entered
the public domain (Nimmer and Nimmer 2005, §4.01 [BJ, §4.03). As a
result, most works were not protected by copyright for any period of
time after first publication; only those few works for which the author
or publisher had complied with the statutory formalities received
copyright protection for the duration provided by law.
7he Nineteenth Century
Throughout the nineteenth Century, the durations of national copy
right or author's rights laws were extended numerous times. In 18 10,
France extended its author's rights law to last for the life of the author,
then for the life of the author's widow, plus an additional 20 years.22
I n 18 14, reciting that "it would afford further encouragement to lit
erature, if the duration of such copyright were extended," England
consolidated its two 14-year terms into a Single term of 28 years, "and
if the author be living at the expiration of that time, till his death."23
I n the United States, lexicographer Noah Webster took up the cause
of extending the existing term of copyright. Webster advocated the
view "that an author has, by common law, or natural justice, the sole
and permanent right to make profit by his own labor" (Webster 1843,
176). I n 1830, a report prepared for the House Judiciary Committee
by Webster's son-in-law, William W. Ellsworth, stated that "an author
has an exclusive and perpetual right, in preference to any other, to the
fruits of his labor" (Gales and Seton 1831, 7: cxix-cxx). Despite this
endorsement of perpetual copyright as a natural right, the 1831 Act
provided only an initial term of 28 years from first publication and a
renewal term of 14 years, which could be claimed by the author's heirs
if the author was deceased.24
I n 1837, Prussia adopted a term of life of the author plus 30 years
after the author's death.25 In the same year, in England, Thomas Noon
22

Act of Feb. 5, 1 8 1 0,Arts. 39-40 (Fr.).
Copyright Act of 1 8 1 4,54 Geo. III, c. 1 56,§9 (U.K.). lhe circumstances leading
to the enactment of this extension are described in Lowndes 1 840,64-72.
2 1 Copyright Act of Feb. 2, 1 8 3 1 , §§ 1 -2, 4 Stat. 436. 'Ihis term was extended to all
subsisting copyrights. lei. § 1 6,4 Stat. 439.
2 , Ordinance of July I I , 1 837, §§5-6 ( Prussia). See Lowndes 1 840, 1 25-26.
23
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Talfourd introduced a bill that sought, among other things, to increase
the period of copyright to life of the author plus 60 years. The bill was
controversial, in large measure because of the length of term it pro
posed, and it was debated at length over the next five years. Talfourd's
bill was opposed by Macaulay, whose opposition killed the original
proposal in 184 1 (Seville 1999, 6, 18-19, 3 1). Macaulay proposed
instead that the existing term be lengthened to the longer of 42 years
from first publication or life of the author (Id., 3 1-3 1, 226). Eventually
a compromise was reached, and the Copyright Act of 1842 provided
an alternative term of life of the author plus seven years, or 42 years
from first publication.26
In 1 866, after a committee report that advocated perpetual rights,
Prance extended the duration of its author's rights laws to life of the
author plus 50 years after the author's death,27 a term that the com
mittee considered "a major concession to the public i nterest" (Davies
1994, 88-89). In 1870, the North German Confederation adopted
a new copyright law which utilized the Prussian term of life of the
author plus 30 years.28 This law was extended to the u nified German
Empire in 1 87 1 .
In 1866, the United Kingdom, Prance, Germany, and seven other
countries adopted the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, under which member nations agreed to provide
copyright protection to the citizens and residents of other member
nations (Ricketson and Ginsburg 2005, 82).29 At the time, however,
the delegates were unable to reach agreement on a uniform duration
of copyright, although they did agree on a non-binding resolution that
recommended a minimum term of life of the author plus 30 years ( Id.
2005, 536-38). I nstead, the Convention provided for "comparison of
terms" (also known as "the rule of the shorter term"), under which
each country would protect works fro m other Berne countries for the
same period of time granted to domestic works, but only so long as the
work was still protected by copyright in its country of origin (Berne

Copyright Act of 1 842, 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, §3 ( U.K.).
Act o f J uly 1 4- 1 9, 1 866, Art. 1 (Fr.).
Gcsetz bctrcffcnd das Urhcbcrrccht a n Schriftwcrkcn, Abbildungcn, musika
lischcn Kompositioncn und dramatischcn \Vcrkcn, Junc 1 1 , 1 870, §§ 8, 9 (N. Gcr.
Conf.). For a summary and English translation, scc Jcrrold 1 8 8 1 , 43-65.
2" Bcrnc Convcntion for thc Protcction of Artistic and Litcrary Works, Scpt. 8,
1 866, art. 2.
2"
27
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1866, art. 2). Once the copyright expired in the country of origin, it
expired in all other Berne nations as well.
For the United States and other nations that remained outside the
Berne Union, there was no legal obligation to provide any copyright
protection to the works of foreign authors; and like most countries,
the United States allowed the published works of foreign authors to be
copied with impunity in the absence of any treaty obligation (Ochoa
2008, 167-71). Moreover, even after the United States began to extend
copyright protection to some foreign authors beginning in 1 89 1, it
granted such protection only if the foreign author complied with the
formalities required by United States law (Id., 1 72- 1 73).30 Thus, for
most of the nineteeth century, the term of protection provided to for
eign authors in the United States was zero.
7he Twentieth Century
A t the 1908 Berlin Conference to revise the Berne Convention, the Ger
man delegation proposed that the term of protection be that granted
to domestic authors in the country in which protection was sought,
without regard to the term in the country of origin. Although this
would have effectively lengthened the term of copyright, the proposal
met with considerable resistance without a uniform term of protection
(Ricketson and Ginsburg 2005, 538-39). Ultimately, the 1908 Berlin
Revision recommended a term of life of the author plus 50 years, but
otherwise retained the "rule of the shorter term."3l Although the Con
vention did not make the term mandatory, the United Kingdom none
theless adopted a life-plus-fifty-years term in its 19 1 1 Copyright Act.32
In 1905, i n the United States, the Librarian of Congress convened a
conference for the purpose of discussing a general revision of the copy
right laws. At the conference, authors and publishers both expressed
the view that the term of copyright ought to be as long as possible,
and they suggested adoption of the French term of life of the author
plus 50 years. The principal reasons advanced were that copyright was

30 Act of M arch 3, 1 89 1 , c. 565, 26 Stat. 1 106.

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 8,
1 886, revised at Berlin, Nov. IS, 1 908, art. 7.
31 Copyright Act of 1 9 1 1, 2 Gco. V c. 46, §3 (U.K.). The Act provided, however, that
after 25 years from the death of the author, anyone could reprint the work by giving
notice and paying a royalty to the copyright owner of ten percent of the publishcd
price for all copies sold (ltl.) .
31
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a natural right of the author; that authors ought not to outlive their
copyrights; that it would provide income to the author's children and
grandchildren; and that it ought not to be shorter than the term pre
vailing in many European countries (Brylawski and Goldman 1975, C3,
C7, Cll, C75, C78; Ochoa 200 1, 33-39). At Congressional hearings in
1906, the star witness was Mark Twain, who believed that copyright
ought to be perpetual (Brylawski and Goldman 1975, JI 16-20; Ochoa
200 1, 36). Twain also remarked, however, that he had been able to
negotiate a much higher price for his works at the time of renewal
(Brylawski and Goldman, K20, K6 1-66, K88, K 163, S 14; Ochoa 200 1,
37-38). As a result, in the 1909 Act Congress retained an initial term
of 28 years, but it extended the renewal term to 28 years, for a maxi
mum duration of 56 years from the date of first publication.33
Elsewhere, the march toward longer terms continued. In 1934, Ger
many adopted a term of life of the author plus 50 years, and Austria
followed suit in 1936.34 Finally, in the 1948 Brussels Revision of the
Berne Convention, a minimum term of life of the author plus 50 years
was made mandatory, while the "rule of the shorter term" was retained
for those nations that had longer terms.35 The basic term of life plus
50 years was carried forward in the 1967 Stockholm Revision and the
197 1 Paris Revision of the Berne Convention.36
In the United States, the Copyright Act of 1976 adopted the Berne
Convention term of life of the author plus 50 years for all works cre
ated on or after January 1, 1978 (except for "works made for hire,"
which were given the shorter of 75 years from first publication or 100
years from creation).37 Those works that had been published or reg
istered before 1978 and were still under copyright retained an i nitial
term of 28 years but had their renewal terms extended to 47 years, for

3J

Copyright Act of 1 909, §§23-24, 35 Stat. 1 075, 1 080-8 1 .
Act o f Dec. 1 3, 1 934, Art. 1 (Ger.); Act o f Apr. 9 , 1 936, Art. 6 0 (Aus.).
3 5 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1 886, revised at Brussels, J u ne 26, 1 948, art. 7( 1 ) (basic term); id. art. 7(2) (comparison
of terms). 'lhe minimum basic term was not applied to cincmatographic and photo
graphic works. Id., art. 7(3).
3 6 Bernc Convention for thc Protcction of Literary and Artistic \Vorks, Sept. 9,
1 886, revised at Stockholm, July 14, 1 967, art. 7( 1 ) (basic tcrm); id., art. 7(8) (com
parison of terms); Bernc Convention, slIpra notc 7, art. 7( 1) (basic tcrm); id., art. 7(8)
(comparision of tcrms).
37 Fortner 17 U.S.c. §302 ( 1 976), 90 Stat. 245 1 , 2572.
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a maximum duration of 75 years from first publication.38 As a tran
sitional measure, those works created before 1978 that had not been
published or registered (and which therefore were still protected by
state common-law copyright) were accorded the same term given to
new works, subject to a statutory minimum term of either 25 or 50
years.39 The adoption of the life-plus-50-years term was principally
motivated by the prospect of eventual U.S. adherence to the Berne
Convention,40 which finally occurred on March 1, 1989,4l
In 1993, the Council of the European Community decided to har
monize copyright terms. At the time, only Germany and Spain had
terms longer than life-plus-SO years; but rather than requiring Ger
many and Spain to reduce their copyright terms, the Council required
all of the other European nations to increase their copyright terms to
life plus-70-years.42 In the same Directive, however, the Council man
dated the use of the rule of the shorter term, so that works from the
U nited States and other non-European countries would not receive
the benefit of the longer term (ld. , art. 7(1)). That, in turn, led Ameri
can copyright holders to pressure Congress to adopt the life-plus-70
years term, which it did in the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Exten
sion Act of 1998 (CTEA).43 Shortly after its enactment, the CTEA was
challenged in court on the grounds that it violated both the Patent and
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
On January 15, 2003, however, the United States Supreme Court held
that the CTEA did not violate the U.S. Constitution,44 meaning that
the terms of protection set forth in the CTEA currently govern the
duration of copyright in the United States.

3"

Former 1 7 U.s.c. §304 ( 1 976),90 Stat. at 2573-74.
Former 17 U.S.c. §303 ( 1 976),90 Stat. at 2573. All unpublished works received
a statutory minimum of 25 years until December 3 1 , 2002; if the work was published
during that period, the statutory minimum was extended through December 3 1 ,2027
( IJ).
10 See H.R. Rep. No. 94- 1476,at 1 35 ( 1 976).
11 See
Berne Convention Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 1 00-568, 102 Stat.
2853.
12 Council
Directive 93/98/EEC of October 29, 1 993, Harmonizing the Term of
Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1 ( 1 ), 1 993 0.). ( L 290) 9.
1 3 P.L. No. 105-298, Title I, 1 1 2 Stat. 2827.
11 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1 86 (20(l3).
39
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2.

CURRENT LAWS ON COPYRIGHT DURATION

Copyright and Neighboring Rights

(

It is important to note that most countries of the world distinguish
between copyright in literary and artistic works and so-called "neigh
boring rights" of performers, producers of sound recordings ("pho
nograms" in international parlance), and broadcasting organizations.
Various reasons have been given for the distinction. For sound record
ings, "the objection was made that these were productions of an
'industrial character' and not capable of constituting literary or artistic
creations" (Ricketson and Ginsburg 2005, 1205). Both broadcasts and
sound recordings are typically produced through the collaboration of a
large number of individuals, making it difficult to identify the "author"
or "authors" of such works. Of course, similar objections were also
raised with respect to both photographs and motion pictures, both of
which are n ow protected under the Berne Convention, so the result
ing division of labor between copyright and neighboring rights seems
to be rather arbitrary, a matter of historical accident more than sound
principle (Id., 1205-1209). Nonetheless, it is a fact that the term of
protection accorded to such "neighboring rights" has lagged behind
the term of protection granted to "literary and artistic works" under
the Berne Convention; indeed, even though photographs and motion
pictures succeeded i n being brought under Berne, the term of protec
tion prOVided to such works has not always kept pace with the basic
term of protection.
International Agreements Concerning Copyright
Article 7 of the Berne Convention provides that "[t]he term of pro
tection granted by this Convention shall be the life of the author and
fifty years after his death" (Berne 1971, art. 7(1)). For works of joint
authorship, the term is measured from the death of the last surviving
author (Id., art. 7bis). H owever, for motion pictures (or "cinemato
graphic works" in international parlance), countries "may provide that
the term of protection shall expire fifty years after the work has been
made available to the public with the consent of the author," or if
the work is not made available to the public, within 50 years after
its making (Id., art. 7(2)). Anonymous and pseudonymous works are
also protected for "fifty years after the work has been lawfully made
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available to the public," unless the author discloses his or her iden
tity during that time (Id., art. 7(3)). Countries are permitted to pro
vide shorter terms of protection to photographic works and works of
applied art, but such terms must last at least 25 years from the time the
work was created (Id., art. 7(4». All the foregoing terms of protection
run to the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise
expire (Id., art. 7(5».
As of October 15,2008, there were 164 members of the Berne Union
(WIPO 2008a). Those countries that were already members of the
Rome Act of the Convention and that had shorter terms on the date
they signed either the Stockholm text or the Paris text were permitted
to retain such shorter terms (Berne 1971, art. 7(7». All countries are
permitted to grant longer terms of protection (Id., art. 7(6». "In any
case, the term shall be governed by the legislation of the country where
protection is claimed; however, unless the legislation of that country
otherwise p rovides, the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the
country of origin of the work" (Id., art. 7(7».
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention requires that the author's moral
rights of attribution and integrity "shall, after his death, be maintained,
at least until the expiry of the economic rights." However, those coun
tries that did not protect such rights after the death of the author at the
time of their accession are permitted to retain terms that cease upon
the author's death (Id., art. 6bis(2)).
'The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) makes all of the substantive provisions of the Berne
Convention (except Article 6bis) enforceable between nations through
the dispute resolution mechanism of the World Trade Organization
(TRIPS, arts. 9, 64).45 As of July 23, 2008, there were 153 members of
the World Trade Organization, all of whom must abide by the TRIPS
Agreement (WTO 2008). TRIPS does not change the basic term of
protection prOVided by Berne except in one instance: Article 12 of
TRIPS requires that photographs and works of applied art be given at
least 50 years of protection from the year of authorized publication,

45 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of I ntellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1 994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex Ie,
Legal I nstruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1 869 U.N.T.S. 299,33 I .L. M. 1 1 97
(J 994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement).
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or if no such publication occurs, 50 years from the date the work was
created (TRIPS, art. 12).
Article 9 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty requires that member
nations give photographic works the same duration of protection as
that provided to other literary and artistic works: namely, life of the
author plus 50 years:16 As of March 5, 2009, 70 countries (including
the United States) were parties to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WIPO
2009c).
In addition to these multilateral treaties, the United States (a net
exporter of copyrighted works) has entered i nto a number of bilateral
Free Trade Agreements that require some of its trading partners (such
as Australia) to adopt a basic term of copyright protection of life of
the author plus 70 years.47 Other countries (such as Canada), how
ever, have resisted pressure from the United States and the European
Union to increase copyright terms beyond those provided in the Berne
Convention.48
International Agreements COl1cernil1g Neighboring Rights
The Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations was signed on October
26, 1961.49 It provides that performers shall have the right to prevent
fixations, reproductions, and broadcasts of their performances (I d., art
7); that producers of phonograms have the right to prohibit reproduc
tions of their phonograms and to be compensated for any broadcasts

16

WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1 996, art. 9, 36 I . L.M. 65.
Sec, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 1 7.4(4) ( M ay 1 8,
2(04). 'lhe Agreement also provides a m inimum term for works made for hire of
70 years after first publication, or i f the work is not published within 50 years, 70
years after creation (Id.). 'I here arc similar provisions i n the Free Trade Agreements
between the United States and Bahrain (Art. 1 4.4(4)), Chile (Art. 1 7.5(4)), Columbia
(Art. 1 6.5(5)), Korea (Art. 1 8.4(4)), Morocco (Art. 1 5.5(5)), Panama (Art. 1 5.5(4)),
Peru (Art. 1 6.5(5)), and Singapore (Art. 1 6.4(4)). I n the Free Trade Agreement with
Oman, the alternative term is 95 years after first publication, or if the work is not
published within 25 years, 1 20 years from creation (Art. 1 5.4(4)). For the full texts of
these agreements, see USTR 2009.
4X Sec, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Art. 1 705 (l ife-phls-50-years);
Copyright Act art. 6, R.S.C. 1 985, ch. C-42, §6; RS.C. 1 993, ch. 44, §6 (Can.). Although
NAFTA's minimum term remains a t life-plus-50 years, in 2003 Mexico adopted a
basic term of life-plus- 100 years. Sec La Ley Federal del Derecho de Autor, A rt. 29
(Mex.).
,') International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono
grams and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26. 1 96 1 . 496 U.N.T.S. 44.
'7

LIMITS ON TIlE DURATION OF COPYRIGHT

169

of their phonograms (Id., arts. 10, 12); and that broadcasting organi
zations have the right to prevent fixations, reproductions or rebroad
casts of their broadcasts (Id., art. 1 3). Under Article 1 4 of the Rome
Convention, such protection shall last at least 20 years from the year
in which the performance took place, the fixation was made, or the
broadcast took place (Id., art. 14). As of February 13, 2009, 88 nations
(not including the United States) were parties to the Rome Conven
tion (WI PO 2009a). 'TIle United States, however, has acceded to the
197 1 Geneva Phonograms Convention, which also provides a right
against unauthorized reproduction for a minimum term of 20 years
from the date of fixation or first publication.50
'The TRIPS Agreement provides rights similar to the Rome Con
vention (except for the compensation for unauthorized broadcasts
of phonograms), but it provides a longer term of protection for per
formers and producers of phonograms of at least 50 years from the
year in which the fixation was made or the performance took place
(TRIPS, art. 14(5)). The minimum term of protection for broadcast
ing organizations remains 20 years from the date the broadcast took
place. (Id.).
'The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) provides
similar protection for both performers and producers of phonograms
(om itting broadcasting organizations), and provides to performers a
m i nimum term of 50 years from the year in which the fixation was
made, and to producers a minimum alternative term of 50 years from
the year in which the phonogram was first published or 50 years from
the year in which the phonogram was fixedY As of December 1 8,
2008, 68 nations (including the United States) were parties to the
WPPT (WIPO 2008b).
I n addition to these multilateral treaties, the United States has
entered i nto a number of bilateral Free Trade Agreements that require
some of its trading partners (such as Australia) to adopt a basic term
of protection for performers of life-plus-70 years, and for phonograms

so

Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against
Unauthorized Duplication of 'lheir Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, art. 4, 25 U.S.T. 309,
866 U.N.T.S. 71. As of February 25, 2009, there were 77 members of the Geneva Pho
nograrns Convention (WI PO 2009b).
5 1 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1 996, 36 I.L.M. 76, arts.
5 - 10 (performers); id. arts. 1 1 - 1 4 (producers); id. art. 17 (terms of protection) .
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of 70 years after first publication, or if the phonogram is not published
within 50 years, 70 years after creation.52
1he European Union
The European Union's Directive on the Term of Protection of Copy
right and Certain Related Rights applies to the 27 members of the
European Union and the three other members of the European Eco
nomic Area.53 Under the Directive, " [tlhe rights of an author of a lit
erary or artistic work . . . shall run for the life of the author and for 70
years after his death (Directive, art. 1 (1 »." For works of joint author
ship, the term is calculated from the death of the last surviving author
(Id., art. 1(2». For anonymous or pseudonymous works and collective
works, the term is the longer 70 years from the year the work is law
fully made available to the public or 70 years from the year of creation,
unless the identity of the individual author or authors is disclosed (Id.,
arts. 1(3), 1(4), 1(6».
Original photographs are given the same term of protection as other
literary and artistic works (Id., art. 6). For cinematographic works, the
term is 70 years after the death of the last of the following to survive:
the principal director, the author of the screenplay, the author of the
dialogue and the composer of music written specifically for the film
(Id., art. 2).
The neighboring rights of performers, producers of phonograms,
and broadcasting organizations last for 50 years after the date of the
performance, the fixation, or the broadcast, respectively; except that if
a performance or phonogram is lawfully published or communicated

,2 See, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 1 7.4(4). 'Ihere are
similar provisions i n the Free Trade Agreements between the United States and Bah
rai n (Art. 1 4 .4 (4)), Chile (Art. 1 7.6(7)),Columbia (Art. 1 6.6(7)), Korea (Art. 1 8.4(4)),
Morocco (Art. 1 5.5(5)), Panama (Art. 1 5.5(4)), Peru (Art. 1 6.6(7)), and Singapore
(Art. 1 6.4(4)). In the Free Trade Agreement with Oman, the alternative term is 95
years after first publication,or i f the work is not published within 25 years, 1 20 years
fro m creation (Art. 1 5.4(4)) . ( USTR 2(09).
5 3 Directive 2006/ l 1 6/EC of December 1 2, 2006, on the Term of Protection of
Copyright and Certain Related Rights, art. 1 ( 1 ), 2006 0.). ( L 374) 1 2; European
Union, Europa: European Countries, Member States of the EU, at http://curopa.cu/
abc/europcan_cou ntrics/eu_mcmbcrs/indcx_en.htm (acccsscd Scpt. I, 2(09); Agrce
mcnt on thc Europcan Economic Area,May 2, 1 992, 1 994 0.). (I, I) 3, anncx XVI I , �
9(, at http://www.cfta.int/contcnt!lcgal-tcxts/cca/anncxcs/anncx 1 7.pdf (accessed Sept.
1 , 2(09).
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to the public during that time, then the right lasts for 50 years after the
earlier of such publication or communication (ld., art. 3).
The Directive also requires that when a previously unpublished
work is published or communicated to the public for the first time, the
publisher must be granted an exclusive right for 25 years from the date
of such publication or communication (Id., art. 4). In addition, the
Directive permits members to protect "critical and scientific editions
of works which have come into the public domain." If such protection
is granted, it may last no longer than 30 years from the year in which
the publication was first lawfully published (ld., art. 5).
As mentioned previously, the Directive mandates the use of the
"rule of the shorter term" with regard to works originating in and
written by nationals of countries that are not covered by the Directive
(ld., art. 7). All terms run to the end of the calendar year in which they
would otherwise expire (ld., art. 8). If a member state provided a lon
ger term of protection as oOuly 1, 1995, the Directive does not require
the m ember state to shorten the term of protection (ld., art. 10( 1».
Finally, it should be noted that the Directive does not apply to the
moral rights of an author, leaving a member state free to apply a lon
ger (or shorter) term for such moral rights (ld., art. 9). In France,
for example, the law expressly states that an author's moral rights are
perpetual. 54
I n April 2009, the European Parliament approved a proposed
amendment to the Directive that would extend the rights of perform
ers and producers of phonograms to 70 years from the first authorized
p ublication or communication to the public (European Parliament
2009). Although this amendment has not yet been approved by the
Council, its probable adoption suggests that the march toward ever
l onger terms continues unabated.
U1lited States
I n the United States, all works published before 1923 were in the pub
lic domain before the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 was enacted. The CTEA did not attempt to revive any expired
copyrights, so all such works remain in the public domain ( I 7 U.S. c.
§304(b». For works first published between 1923 and 1963, the term

51

Law No. 92-597 of July \ , 1 992 (Fr.), as amcndcd, art. L. 1 2 1 - 1 .
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of copyright under the 1909 Act was 28 years, which could be renewed
once;55 the renewal term was extended twice and is now 67 years, for
a maximum duration of 95 years from first publication ( 17 U.S.c.
§304(b». Copyright Office records, however, show that less than 15
percent of the works registered during this time period were renewed;
the remaining 85 percent are in the public domain if they are works
by American authors or works first published in the United States
(Ringer 1960, 222).56 In 1992, copyright renewal was made automatic,
so all works first published between 1964 and 1977 have a duration of
95 years from the date of first publication (comprising a 28-year i nitial
term and a 67-year renewal term) ( 17 U.S.c. §§304(a), 304(b)).
For works created in 1978 or later, the basic term is life of the author
plus 70 years (Id., §302(a». For so-called "joint works" (Le., works of
joint authorship), the term if life of the last surviving author plus 70
years (Id., §302(b)). For works made for hire, the term is 95 years fro m
the date of first publication, or 120 years from the date of creation,
whichever is shorter (Id., §302(c)).
Works created before 1978, but not published or registered before
1978, get the same term provided to new works: life of the author
plus 70 years, or the alternative fixed term for works made for hire.
These works, however, were subject to a statutory minimum term of
25 years from January I , 1978, which has now expired (Id., §303(a)).
As a result, any works created before 1978 that remained unpublished
as of December 3 1, 2002, are now in the public domain if the author of
the work died more than 70 years before the current year began (Reese
2007, 59 1; Gard 2006, 690). 'TIlOse works that were created before 1978,
but which were first published between 1978 and 2002, received the
same term as new works, subj ect to a statutory minimum term, which
has been extended to December 3 1, 2047 ( 17 U.S.c. §303(a)).
A special situation applies to copyright in sound recordings. Sound
recordings were not added to the federal Copyright Act until February
I S, 1972. Any sound recordings fixed on or after that date are enti
tled to the same term of protection as that granted to other works of

" Fonner 1 7 U.S.c. § 2 4 ( I 909; repealed 1 976).
Works of foreign origin that were i n the public domain i n the U.S. for failure to
comply with formalities such as notice or renewal. b u t that were not yet i n the public
domain in their country of origin. had their copyrights restored effective January I .
1 996 . See 1 7 U.S.c. § 104A(a)( I ) (A); id. § I04A(h)(2) (defi ning "date o f restoration") ;
id. § I04A(h)(6) (defining "restored work").
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authorship. Any sound recordings fixed before that date, however, are
governed by state law rather than by federal law; and federal law pro
vides that any state-law protection shall not be preempted by federal
law until Pebruary I S, 2067 (95 years from the date sound recordings
first became eligible for federal copyright protection) (Id., §30 1(c)).
This leaves the term of copyright in such pre- 1972 sound recordings
up to the individual states.
O nly one state has a statute regarding the duration of copyright in
such sound recordings: California provides that all such sound record
ings will be protected until February I S, 2047.57 In one other state
there is a court decision concerning the duration of copyright in such
sound recordings. In 2005, the New York Court of Appeals (the high
est court in the state of New York) held that sound recordings had
a perpetual common-law copyright under New York law; that such
sound recordings were not placed in the public domain when pho
n orecords of the sound recording were reproduced and distributed in
New York; and that such sound recordings did not enter the public
domain in New York when their copyrights expired in their country of
origin.58 Consequently, all sound recordings will remain under copy
right in the state of New York until state law is preempted by federal
law on Pebruary 15, 2067.
3.

CONCLUSION

A rational choice concerning the duration of copyright cannot be
made until some kind of consensus has been reached on the rationale
for copyright protection. While common-law systems started from a
utilitarian perspective, international harmonization has moved them
much closer toward the natural right view of copyright that prevails in
most civil law countries. Even i n such countries, however, the counter
vailing considerations of increased access to literary and artistic works
and the difficulty of identi fying and locating copyright owners have led
to some temporal limit on the duration of copyright.
The history of copyright duration demonstrates that while copy
right terms have been lengthened a number of times, they are almost

,7

Cal. Civ. Code §980(a)(2).
Capitol Records. Inc. v. Naxos of America. Inc
20(5).
"M See

.•

830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y.
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never shortened. 'This is consistent with the principles of public choice
theory discussed above, which hold that when the benefits of a law are
concentrated but the costs of that law are diffuse, a small well-focused
interest group will usually succeed in obtaining passage of the law,
even if it does not benefit society as a whole. H owever, because of
the controversy concerning the CTEA, public awareness of the costs
of extending the duration of copyright has been raised (Karjala 2007;
Lessig 2004). TIlUS, while it can be expected that copyright owners
will attempt to obtain further extensions of the copyright term i n
the future, it also should b e expected that they will meet with more
Significant opposition than they faced in 1998. Whether opponents
of copyright term extension will have the political power to succeed
in defeating future attempts at copyright term extension, however,
remains to be seen.
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